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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines minority participation in the Navy
officer corps, 1973 to 1983. Some comparisons of the expe-
riences of white officers, and of the officer corps of ether
services, are introduced as yardsticks for the Navy minority
experience. A brief history of minority military participa-
tion prior to the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (A7F)
is presented. Demographic trends observable within the
American population are presented and compared with planned
manpower requirements for the next ten years. A brief
dsscription of minority experience in the N.avy Officer Corps
during the AVF era is presented.
A comparison of sources of entry of minority officers
into the military, and how the Navy differs from the other
services, as well as the significance of such a difference,
are presented. An examination of perceptions and career
intentions cf minority officers ia the Navy and how they
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I. INTBODOCTION 1ND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Department of Defense (DOD) concluded that
institutional racial discrimination and discrimination
against ethnic minorities had existed, and continued to
exist, in all branches [Ref- 1 ]. rhera is some evidence to
suggest that this discrimination continues today in a subtle
manner and probably is most visible in the composition of
the officer corps of the service.
The significance of racial discrimination existing in
the officer ranks as opposed to such discrimination existing
in the enlisted force, lies in the control that officers
have within the military institution. Organizational
changes in the military are made from the top downwards, not
from *the bottom up. Thus, elimination of discrimination
must occur at the top first, if that elimination is to be
permanent.
Using any of three of the more oommon measures of "equi-
table representation"
—
i.e., the minority percentage of the
general population, the minority psrcentage of the enlisted
force, and the minority percentags of the 'officer poten-
tial* pool of college graduates nationwide— none of the
services have achieved proportionate representation after
ten years of the All-Volunteer Forca , either in distribution
across occupations or in total numbers of minority officers.
Two services, the Army and the Air Force are approaching
equitable representation with regard to the percentage of
the minority * officer potential* pool. The Marine Corps has
also made significant progress towards this target. The
Navy, however, remains farthest from this and all other
measures of "equitable" minority officer representation.
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None of the services has achieved proportionate racial
distribution in the middle or senior grade ranks. This is,
at least partly, a function of tins. The length of time
needed to "grow" minority officers eligible for promotion to
senior ranks still exceeds the period which has passed since
the initiation of increased efforts to recruit minority
accessions.
The overall participation rates of minorities, in the
military, have been improving sinoe the 1970 extension of
Executive Order 11246 (requiring affirmative action as well
as egual opportunity) to cover the Department of Defense.
This improvement has been almost entirely due to the great
increases in the minority composition of the enlisted force.
(Paralleling the situation in the officer ranks, the Navy
lags all other services in minority enlisted participation,
except in Asian- American and Pacific Islander participation
rates) . Except- for the Navy, the participation rates of
minorities in all services greatly exceeds that of the
minority percentages of the general population.
The importance of accomplishing higher racial represen-
tation rates arises both from questions of social equity and
from an analysis of future Navy manpower requirements. This
thesis deals only with the latter issue. Given the
increasing manpower needs of the Navy and the changing
proportions of the recruiting pool, it is clearly in the
Navy*s best interest to do a much better job of attracting
minorities. The Navy cannot afford to ignore a population
that already constitutes 16 percent of the general popula-




B. BACKGROUND - HISTORY OF MINORITY PARTICIPATION POLICIES.
For most of its history, the nation's military has been
a profession reserved for white Americans. The personnel
policies have mirrored the racial prejudices prevalent in
the rest of society. This has been modified only when
forced by circumstances and only for as long as such
circumstances prevailed.
Effectively, military planners accepted minorities as
laborers with reasonable frequency, but allowed participa-
tion in enlisted combat roles only during times of great
crisis and discontinued such participation as quickly as
possible, after the crises had passed. With the exception
of a very few chaplains and coastal pilots, no professional
or officer employment of minorities was practiced by the
military prior to World War II.
1 • R evolut ionary War t c the Kor e an Conflict
The purpose of the militia during early Colonial
times was to defend domestic order. There was no limit
placed on any males, regardless of race or economic status.
However, by 1639 fear of training fiture black rebels led to
the adoption of legal provisions excluding blacks from mili-
tary service in Virginia. Massach usettes and Connecticut
followed suit in 1656 and 1661, respectively. Other colo-
nies restricted black participation to musician, laborer and
other auxiliary functions. Periodic difficulties with the
Indians and French forces caused temporary exceptions to
this policy, to relieve manpower shortages to meet specific
crises.
The Revolutionary War, which lacked the support of a
considerable portion of the white population, caused a
severe shortage of men willing to fight for independence.
The initial recruitment of militiamen for this conflict took
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men from all races and classes who could be induced to join.
In 1775, however, the fears of slaveholders forced
Washington to proscribe new enlistaents of blacks. Those
blacks already on duty were allDwed to remain. Loose
enforcement of this ban allowed the use of blacks to serve
in place of whites, and active recruitment of blacks was
carried on by various units in spite of it. Ultimately, the
Continental Congress sanctioned black recruitment, and
approximately 5,000 blacks served with the colonial forces
CHef. 2].
No blacks were formally authorized to serve in the
Quasi-War with Prance in the 1790's or in the War of 1812.
Several did serve without such official sanction. Other
minorities were of insignificant numbers to matter during
this period. The large influx of Hispanics occurred after
the acquisition of Texas, California, the Louisiana Purchase
and Florida. American Indians wara largely regarded as
enemies of the new republic and thus not considered candi-
dates for enlistment, apart from limited use as Army scouts.
Also, the Army and Navy of the United States during the
years between 18 14 and the start of the Civil War were small
enough that minority manpower was not crucial. The Mexican
War placed the only significant s-rain on the military, and
even this was easily handled by the rapidly growing white
population.
The Civil War allowed blacks to resume legal partic-
ipation in military service, and in combat bearing arms.
Initial concerns about border state loyalty kept Lincoln
from openly allowing the use of blacks. At the unit levels,
however, commanders took in blacks to meet manning require-
ments without regard to the official position of the govern-
ment. After the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation
in 1863, active recruitment of blacks was conducted by all
Union s-ates. "Colored" units were formed and led by white
14

officers. This marked the start of unit segregation by race
in the military. By the end of the war, blacks made up
nearly 10 percent of the Union Army. Blacks were not
admitted to either of the two services as officers. However,
this war saw the use of blacks as coastal, river and harbor
pilots by the Navy. While not accorded commissioned rank,
service as pilots marked the first time blacks were offi-
cially regarded as professionals by the United States
military [ Ref. 2 ].
After the Civil War, black units were kept en active
duty and used extensively in the Indian wars of the American
West. Blacks were used in all functional roles in both the
Army and Navy, except for the role of officer. In the Army,
tha segregated units were maintainad. The Navy permitted
blacks to serve without regard to segregated units. This
was undoubtedly due more to the impracticality of segrega-
tion aboard ship than to snlightened social awareness. This
situation continued until World War I. The segregated Army
units and black members of the Navy fought in all major
conflicts during the period including the Spanish- American
War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Pershing
expedition into Mexicc.
World War I started with ths percentage of blacks in
the military roughly equal to thsir percentage of the
general population. This remained so, throughout the war
because of the selective service process which was used in
filling manpower requirements .Significantly, during this
conflict, the practice of using blacks primarily in service
roles (food service, quartermaster, laundry and other
logistic duties) returned in both the Army and Navy. The
black Army units and the black sailors in non-service
ratings were kept on and their numbers actually increased,




Also during this conflict, the Navy began -ha
recruitment of Philippine nationals into service-related
billets. This would lead, after the war, to a virtual halt
in the recruitment of blades into the Navy. Also, both the
Army and the Navy excluded blacks from their officer corps,
with only a handful of exceptions (mainly black chaplains) .
The third service, the Marine Corps, then considered a more
integral part of the Navy than it is today, did not use
black recruits during the war and remained 'white only' in
both its officer and enlisted ranks until World War II.
Following the Great War, the Navy informally
restricted the use of blacks to the steward and mess man
ratings. This was the first occupational segregation policy
instituted by the Navy. Ships remained integrated, however
the practice of recruiting Filipinos into the service
ratings greatly reduced the total number of blacks in the
Navy. (An interesting side note to this practice is that it
continues today, with Philippine Nationals beiag recruited
into the Navy in all occupations not requiring security
clearances. It is this practice which has resulted in a
high percentage of ncn-black, non-Hispanic minority enlisted
members in the Navy relative to the other services.)
The Army maintained its segregated black units
during the years between the wars. The policy of an all-
white officer corps was kept by all the services. The
emerging air services, both the Army Air Corps and the Naval
and Marine Corps aviation branches were kept completely
segregated prior to the start of World War II. Two aspects
of the military racial policies of this time, which should
be noted, were the existence of the Army and Navy as sepa-
rate arms of the government and the different natures of the
two services.
The War Department, containing the Army, and the
Navy Department each had cabinet lsvel status and were not
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required to coordinate their individual personnel policies.
Also, prior to the great "expansion of the Navy during World
War II, the Navy was far more completely a seagoing service
than it is today. The Navy was not only smaller than the
Army; it was considerably less in evidence in normal
American society. The issue of integrated ships was at
least somewhat abstract to the bulk of society, which had
little contact with ships in general, and with the Navy in
particular. The Army, by contrast, maintained posts in
every state and territory of the continental United States.
Soldiers, while not forming a part of every community, were
widespread geographically. This added to the pressure on
the Army to at least be cognizant of the effect of
integration as viewed by the non-military citizens.
The former factor, of the separate Army and Navy
Departments, became important in 1940. During the
election, pressure from the black community forced President
Roosevelt to stipulate personnel policy for the War
Department, which had the following main points: (1) the
proportion of blacks in the Army would be that of blacks in
the general population, (2) black units would be established
in all branches (combatant and non-combatant) of the Army,
and (3) blacks would be admitted to officer candidate
schools so that they could serve as pilots in black aviation
units [Ref. 2]. This last point was the first deliberate
attempt to train blacks for duty as line officers in combat
units.
This policy was not implemented by the Navy or
Marine Corps, and the issue was not addressed by the Navy
Department until the use of the draft was forced upon the
sea services in the latter half of 1942.
During World War II, limited integration of the
officer corps was achieved in all services. By the end of
the war, black servicemen had participated in all theaters
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and in all roles. However, the bulk of them had been
relegated to non-combat units, and the goal of equaling the
percentage of blacks in the general population was never
achieved by any of the services.
During the war, the percentage of blacks in the Army
achieved a high-water mark of 8.7 percent (officers and
enlisted combined) . The corresponding percentages for the
Navy (4 percent) and Marine Corps (2.5 percent) were even
farther from proportionate representation. Additionally,
although the integration of Army and Marine Corps units was
achieved in a few cases, segregation remained the rule in
most units. Navy ships continued to be integrated with both
blacks (as officers and enlisted) and Filipinos (enlisted
only) .
After the war, there was a significant tendency to
back-slide by the services. Sevaral things had changed
however, and this tendency was strongly, and successfully,
opposed by a more politically aware minority population.
The armed services, now numbering four (with the addition of
the Air Force), were gathered into a single department, and
personnel policies were now applied across the beard. In
1948, Executive Order 9981 formally required equal opportu-
nity of treatment in the services. There was considerable
foot dragging, especially by the Amy.
Despite this resistance, it may fairly be claimed
that from this point on, the military stayed ahead of
society in general in creating opportunities for minorities.
Discrimination had not ended, but it had lessened consider-
ably and formal policies of redress were made available to
minority service members. The struggle now shifted to
various forms of institutional discrimination against
minorities—such asthe lack of offioer recruiting efforts on
the campuses of predominantly black colleges--which in large
part, reflected the current status quo in society. The
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proportions of minorities in the officer ranks and in the
better paid and preferred enlisted occupations improved at a
slow pace.
2 . Korea through Vietnam
After Korea, slow but steady progress was made. In
1954 the last all-black units were sither abolished or inte-
grated. During the Vietnam buildup, the proportions of
blacks in the military steadily improved. Complaints of
inequity came to center more on the selective service mecha-
nism and recruitment standards. In sharp contrast to
previous wars, black servicemen bore a disproportionate
percentage of the burdens of combat, including battle deaths
and injuries. Additionally, educated, healthy blacks tended
to disproportionately bear the brunt of military service,
relative to the entire black population.
Another unique function of the military during this
period was its use by the government- as a social tool in
rectifying inequities in society at large. The military was
seen as a path for advancement for disadvantaged members of
society. It was particularly useful as a means to provide
better employment and training opportunities for minorities.
As part of the "War on Poverty", Project Dne Hundred
Thousand (an essentially social program, involving the
recruitment of 100,000 people from the disadvantaged
segments of society per year) , was created by President
Johnson. This resulted in the enlistment of 2^6,000 people
over a three-year period, who otherwise would have been
excluded from military service for sub-par edcuational
achievement. Forty percent of this group was black.
As racial tensions increased in society, the mili-
tary began to experience violent racial incidents in the
late sixties and early seventies, running about five years
behind society in this regard. These incidents had only a
19

minor impact on military operations, but did signify that
the military had lost its vanguard position in the area of
equal opportunity for minorities. Society in general was
now advancing at a faster rate than the services.
3« Post Vietnam
After the Vietnam War, the implementation of affir-
mative action, as well as equal opportunity programs helped
to reduce discrimination in the enlisted ranks. This
process continued through the start of the All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) and applied to all minorities. The one very
noticeable area where little progress was being made was in
the officer ranks. It is also daring this period that
significant numbers cf Hispanics began to join the services.
There begin to be two sizeable minorities in the Army, Air
Force and Marine Corps, and three in the Navy which has
retained the practice of enlisting Filipinos and therefore
has a large percentage of Asians/Pacific Islanders.
Except in this last group, the Navy begins at this
point (1973, the start of the AVF) to be left behind by the
ether services in attracting and retaining minorities. This
is especially true in the Navy officer corps. The ranks of
Navy enlisted minorities grew more slowly than did those of
the other services, and still (as of 1983) are far smaller
than the Defense Department averages. However, by 1983, the
Navy has achieved roughly the same proportion of enlisted
minority accessions as exists in the general population (12
percent) .
C. SOHHARY
This thesis examines the period from 1973 to the
present. This period starts three years subsequent to the
initiation of affirmative action programs and covers the
20

whole of the All-Volunteer Force era. This examination is
limited to derails of minority participation in the Navy
officer corps. Some comparisons, relative to the experi-
ences of white officers and relative to the officer corps of
the other services, are introduced as yardsticks for the
Navy minority experience.
Chapter Oae presents a brief history of minority partic-
ipation in the United States Armed Forces prior to the
inception of the All-Volunteer Force.
Chapter Two presents observable demographic trends
within the general American population and compares them
with planned Navy manpower requirements for the next, ten
years.
Chapter Three presents a brief description of the
minority experience in the Navy officer corps during the all
volunteer Era, 1973-1983. This includes some comparisons
with the experience of the other services.
Chapter Four presents a comparison of sources for entry
by minorities into the militaryofficer corps, and how the
Navy differs from the other services in this regard, as well
as the significance of such a difference.
Chapter Five presents an examination of the perceptions
and career intentions of junior officers in all branches of
the military and analyzes how the perceptions and intentions
of minority officers in the Navy differ from those of
minority officers in the other services.
21

II. HAHPOMER REQUIREMENTS MP RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHICS
This chapter examines the increases in the Navy's demand
for manpower and the changing natura of the supply of avail-
able manpower in American society. In particular, the
planned growth of the Navy officer ranks and the 'shrinking
pool' of potential officer candidates is addressed; as well
as the growing minority proportion of that 'shrinking pool'.
A. HAHPOiER REQUIREMENTS
The main driving force behind ninority participation in
the military in the past has been the need for sufficient
manpower to meet military crises, or white shortfalls during
times of peace. The issue of equitable treatment for minor-
ities has been either ignored (as it was throughout the
pre-Civil War period) or relegated to secondary considera-
tion. Today, even though equity has become an important
consideration, and indeed continues to grow in importance,
the requirement for manpower still exerts a decisive force
for equal opportunity. The services require large numbers
of recruits each year to maintain the largest peacetime
military force in our history. Tae end-strength of active
duty personnel for all of the Department of Defense is
planned to grow by 1 percent, from 2.07 million in FY 81 to
2.29 million in FY 87 [Ref. 3],
1 • The 60 Shi£ Nav y
The Reagan Administration has committed itself to an
activist foreign policy and to a buildup of the Nation's
defenses. A major part of these commitments is the creation
of a 600 ship, fifteen battlegroup Navy, by 1990 (Ref. 3].
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The Navy will grow by 15 percent, from 527,000 to 607,000 in
end- strength over the six-year period starting in FY 31.
This substantial growth in naval forces will increase the
Navy's demand for manpower. Throughout the remainder of the
decade, the Navy must compete successfully in the labor
market to attract a growing number of recruits and to retain
qualified personnel. Additionally, the ongoing moderniza-
tion of the Navy and its increasing reliance upon high tech-
nology systems has caused the demand for top quality
recruits to grow even faster than the overall demand.
Similar trends in civilian, and federal agencies,
are also making the retention of high quality personnel an
increasing problem. This is especially critical in the
officer ranks. The last ten years have seen a dramatic
shift in emphasis on engineering aid hard science education
requirements for officer candidates. As outlined below, the
pool of young (under 30) college-trained minority people is
still small. The members of this pool who have received a
technical education are few in number, and much sought after
by industry as well as by the other services.
2- Department of Defense Ex£an§ion
The expansion of the Army, Air Force and Marine
Corps and the resulting competition for qualified officer
candidates is the second most important factor, after the
increased need of the Navy itself, in complicating the
problem of improving minority officer participation. As
outlined below, these services will also be trying to
increase their 'catch 1 from the small pool of potential
minority officer candidates.
The outlook for the Army throughout the remainder of
the 1980's is for an expansion of end-strength of only 3
percent, from 781,000 in FY 81 to 807,000 by FY 87. This is
the smallest percentage increase of any of the services.
23

However, at the same time, the Army is greatly increasing
its level of technical sophistication. The Army maintains
the largest Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) presence
on civilian campuses and devotes the greatest amount of
money and resources cf any of tha services to recruiting
college students into its officer training programs.
Additionally, it can point to a significantly better record
than the Navy*s, of minority progress up its officer ranks.
The Air Force will experience the largest growth
both in percentage and total numbers over the next several
years. This growth will be especially competitive with tha
goal of improving the Navy's minority officer participation,
in -chat the Air Force is the most "officer intensive" of the
services. Overall, the Air Forca expects to grow by 18
percent, from 570,000 to 670,000 by 1937. Additionally, the
Air Force has traditionally enjoyed higher retention rates
than the ether services and, like the Army, can boast a
p
better record of minority progress than the Navy in the
officer ranks. The Air Force alsD possesses a larger ROTC
presence on civilian campuses than the Navy. Moreover, the
Air Force will be competing directly for the technically-
trained officer candidates that the Navy is trying to
attract.
The Marine Corps expansion, while only 7 percent
(totaling 22,300 by FY 87) , has particular importance for
the Navy*s racruiting drive. In the critical area of
officer recruiting, the Marine Corps is the major competitor
for Naval Academy and Naval Reserva Officer Training Corps
(NROTC) graduates. Although tha Marine Corps has done
better than the Navy in minority officer participation, it
still will be trying to improve its performance. Since the
Marine Corps competes directly for the most select pool of
potential Naval officers (those who have shown strong enough
interest to join NROTC or the Academy and have met the
24

requirements) it too will be an impediment in improving
minority officer participation rates in the Navy.
TABLE I
Planned DOD Growth FT. 1981-87
(figures in thousands)





































DOD 2071 2099 2130 2173 2220 2254 2287 10
note: Navy numbers exclude TARS (reserves on active
duty for training and' administration of reserves)
Source: Military Manpower Task Force, October 1982
TABLE II
DOD Growth Achieved as of 31 HAH 83
Service Amount %Chg XPlan
(in thousands)
Army 7 82
Navy 5 55 5 34
OSMC 199 4 61
OSAF 592 3 22
DOD 2127 3 26
Source: Defense Almanac,
September 1983
Table I presents the planned growth of each of the
services for the period, and taole II shows the growth
achieved as of 31 March 1983- The column in table II
labeled 'Percent Plan* measures tha amount of the planned
increase which has been reached by each service as of 31
March 1983. For example, the CT. S. Marine Corps has grown
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by 4 percent since 1981. This represents 61 percent of the
total growth which is planned for the Marines by 1987. The
listings of not applicable for the Army reflect that only
negligible growth was planned for the Army by 1983. The
bulk cf Army growth, as shown in table I, is to come in
fiscal years 1984 through 1987.
TABLE III
DOD Officer Ranks: 31 HAH 1983





















note: ^growth based on FY 81 totals
Source: Military Manpower Task Force,
October 1982
The overall reguirements for growth shown above
include both enlisted and officer rsquirements. The Navy's
problem is even more acute when the focus is narrowed to
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officer growth alone. Table III depicts the size of the
officer ranks relative to the entire force, and table 17
shows the plained growth in those ranks. It is notewcr x hy
that the two sea services have smaller ratios of officers to
enlisted personnel than the other two services. This gives
greater visibility to officers in these services and
increases the importance of improving minority representa-
tion among the officer ranks. Also, given a relatively
smaller officer corps and a greater opportunity for growth,
it should be easier for the Navy to achieve mere
proportionate representation.
As shown in table IV, the Navy's requirement for
additional officers is nearly equal to that of the rest of
the Defense Department combined. Also, it should be noted
that the Navy typically recruits approximately 10 percent of
its officer corps each year, to replace leavers. This
factor has held even during the relatively good retention
achievements of the past three years. Without continued
gains in retention, the twenty 20,000 n*ew officers will come
as additions to the normal turnover, which presently aver-
ages between 5,800 and 7,000 annually. As of 31 March 1983,
the Navy had achieved a total officer corps of 67,062, up
1,180 from the starting level of 1931.
The large amount of growth planned for the Navy
officer corps, relative to the other services, is influ-
enced, at least in part, by the expected expansion of the
Battle Force to fifteen battle groups. This entails the
construction and operation of two additional battle groups,
each built around a carrier and its air wing. Carriers and
air wings are particularly officer intensive units, as
compared to typical Army or Marine Corps ground units, ani




The requirements of American industry for
college-educated minority employees has grown. All civilian
firms dealing with the federal government and with many
state and local governments must show compliance with
federal regulations regarding equal opportunity and affirma-
tive acticn. Additionally, political and economic pressure
from the minority segments of the population have influenced
industry to seek out and hire qualified racial and ehtnic
minorities. Civilian firms are a major source of competi-
tion with the military for college-educated and
technically-educated minorities.
The problems mentioned aoovs also apply to the
recruiting of white officer candidates and enlisted
personnel. As shown below, the declining number of white
eligibles relative to the numbers of: minorities entering the
18-24 age group give an added urgency -o the problem of
improving minority participation.
B. RELEVANT DEHOGBAPHICS
Since 1903 the population of the United States has grown
from approximately 76 million to 226 million, with most of
this growth (71.4 percent) occurring since 1940. As shown in
table V, the minority percentage in the past thirty years
has grown from roughly 10 percent of the total population to
14 percent and is expected to approach 18 percent by the
turn of the century.
One potentially misleading aspect of table V is the
method of accounting for Hispanics as a unique minority.
Through the 1970 census, Hispanics were not counted sepa-
rately. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race and
were included mainly in the white category, with some being
carried under black and other categories. Beginning in






87.5 1 1. 1 1. a
85.9 1 1.8 2. 3
subcategory, bat are counted mainly in the 'other 1 category,
with some remaining as before in the black group.
TABLE 7
Racial Composition - U.S. Population (1910-1980)
Selected Years







Source: Bureau of Census
Within the general population, aowever, the military is
primarily interested in the pool of young men (and to a
lesser extent, young women) between the ages of 18 and 2U
years. It is from the portion of this pool, consisting of
persons gualified for military service, that nearly ail of
the recruits into the military are drawn each year. In this
segment of the population, two important trends have
developed since 1970. As shown in table VI, the input into
this pcrtion on the population peaked during 1975 and has
decreased steadily since then. Additionally, the percentage
growth of minorities in this age group has exceeded the
percentages of minorities in the gsneral population. An
immediately apparent implication of these two trends,
coupled with the need of the military to expand, is that the
recruitment of increasing numbers of minorities may be
necessary.
In addition, table VI shows that the overall popula-
tion of 18-24 year olds is projected to decline by 21
percent over the next twelve years. Two other trends also




U.S. Population by Age and Sex - Selected Years, 1960-1995
(numbers in thousands)
Age Range (years) and Sex
year 14 - 17 18 - 21 22 •- 2H 13-24
- — —
— male female male female male remale total
1960 5,683 5, 536 4,810 4,745 3,284 3,289 16,128
1970 8,108 7,816 7,444 7,275 5,007 4,986 24,712
1975 8,722 8,40 6 8,454 8,220 5,683 5,648 28,00 5
1980 8,226 7,910 8,903 8,621 5,440 6,373 30,337
1983 - — —
—
— — — — 30,055
1984 - — — —
—
— — — 29,476
1985 - — -- — — - — - - 28,715
1990 — — — — —
•
-- — 25,777
1995 -- — — — — — 23,634
Source: Bureau of Census
minorities in this group and the changing ethnic mix of
college enrollments.
Census projections for age groups by ethnic origin were
not readily available. Tables VII and VIII compare the 1980
ethnic composition of 18-to 24-year-old group and the 10-tc
14-year-old group. While not an exact projection, the
composition of the 10-14 year old group does give a reason-
able indication of the trend towards a greater minority
representation in the 18-24 year group over the next several
years, excluding migration effects.
Note: Tables VII and VIII are based on the 1980 census.
This census counted persons of Hispanic origins as members
of specific racial groups (ie., white, black, Native
American, etc.) and as a separate athnic group. Thus, the
figures and percentages shown in the tables will not add up
to 100 percent.
The enrollment mix of college students is shown in table
IX, and high school enrollment percentages in table X. The
trend toward a greater availability of educationally guali-




Ethnic Composition 18-24 Ags Group (198D)
Ethnicity number (in thousands) percentage
both sexes males both sexes males
White 24,294 12,223 80.4 81.2
Black 3,914 1,885 13.0 12.5
Hispanic 2,240 1,158 7.7 7.7
Amerind 216 108 0.7 0.7
Asian 439 219 1.5 1.5
Total Minority 6,809 3,370 22.7 22.4
Dverall Totals 30,022 15 f 054 100 100
note: percents and totals do not add ud due to
rounding and double counting of Hispanics.
Source: Bureau of Census
TABLE VIII
Ethnic Composition 10-14 Age Group (1980)
Ethnicity number (in thousands) percentage

























note: oercents and totals do not add up iue ;o
rouniing and double counting of Hispanics.
Source: Bureau of Cansus
qualified white candidates is clear. This re-eiphasizes the
need for the Navy to improve its record in minority officer
participation.
As shown above, the minority proportion of college
enrollment has grown from 11.7 percent to 15.2 percent
during the first nine years of the AVF. Table X, shows that
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this trend is continuing in the high schools, where the
proportion of blacks and Hispanics has risen from 17.7
percent to 21.5 percent during the sains period.
The data shown in tables IX and X offer an indirect,
indication of the fact, that in addition to struggling to
comply with egual opportunity and affirmative action
legislation, civilian employers will be finding young hires
of any ethnic group increasingly scarce. Also, colleges may
well be scrambling to maintain enrollments. The various
efforts of employers and higher education to attract membars
of the smaller 18-24 year old group will directly increase
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6 84 290 88.3 8. 2 3.5
8 14 354 86.9 9. 1 4.0
948 411 86.2 9.6 4.2
1,,062 427 85.3 10. 5 4.2
1,r 1 03 413 85.3 10.7 4.0
1,,020 377 85.9 10. 3 3.3
1 ,002 440 85.3 9.9 4.3
1,,0 07 443 85.9 9.8 4.3
1
(r1 33 510 84.8 10.5 4.7
Source: Bureau of Census
Of particular interest to ths Navy's minority officer
recruitment efforts are the number of minorities who actu-
ally complete the requirements for a bachelor's degree and
the number of such people who acquire bachelor's degrees in
technical areas. Table XI provides such data for 1975-1979,
for black and Hispanic graduates.
The extramely low percentages of technical degrees
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Source: Bureau of Census
TABLE II
Minority Bachelor Degrees 1975-1979
Bachelor Degrees Conferred
(totals in hundreds)







































relating to the ROTC programs. Sinoe 1976, the ROTC program
has required that 80 percent of the students on full
scholarship must major in engineering or hard sciences. The
Naval Academy has a similar requirement.
The last demographic measure important to the issue of
minorities in the military is the continuing low position of
minorities on the socio-economic ladder. The most
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frequently used measure of this phenomenon is the
unemployment rate of minorities. Table XII compares -his
rate for the largest minority, blacks, with that of whites
in the critical 18-24 year old group.
TABLE XII


















































Source: 0. S. Dept. of Labor, July 1933
The unemployment situation for other minorities is less
easily captured due to such factors as the uncertain
counting of Hispanics and the difficulty of establishing
criteria for job searching status for illegal immigrants and
reservation Indians. However, the poor comparison with
white unemployment rates, similar ~o (if less extreme) than
the blacks, seeis to hold true for Hispanics and Native
Americans.
Asians and Pacific Islanders present difficulties of
measurement which stem from the diverse nature of this
group. This minority is made up of large, well-established
groups, such as the American-Chinese and Nisei Japanese, and
newly arrived immigrants, such as the Vietnamese boat
people. Unemployment rates vary widely across these groups.
One aspect of the unemployment is reasonably safe to
generalize about— that is, the rates for the various minori-
ties will very likely continue to exceed that of white
34

Americans foe the next several years. High civilian
unemployment rates usually result in increased applications
for military enlistment, as indiviluals who would otherwise
seek civilian jobs turn to the military as a second choice.
Therefore, within the 'shrinking pool' of potential officer
candidates, the minority segment should be somewhat easier
to attract than their white cohorts.
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III. HISQRirY OFFICER PARTICIPATION
, 1973;:1983
The Selective Service was tha overriding determinant
affecting the composition of the armed forces from World War
II through 1972. While careerists wera volunteers (at least
from the point of deciding to remain in the military)
throughout this period, first term enlisted and initial
obligation officers were a mixed group of draftees,
draft-induced volunteers and unaffaoted (true) volunteers.
Since January 1973, all entry into military service has
been entirely "voluntary", in the sense that there is no
longer compulsory service. Extensions of military service
beyond initial obligation have been voluntary, although
there still exists the possibility of involuntary extension
of active duty to six years after a voluntary entry into the
service, regardless of the initial contract length.
This change in accession policy has had a significant
impact on minority participation rates. Enlisted minority
participation increased from 11 percent in 1970 to 17
percent in 1975. Additionally, there was a 'skimming the
cream 1 effect within the black community. As a result of
service selection criteria, those 18-24 year old blacks who
did join wera better educated than the average 18-24 year
old black and also came from an above average black
socioeconomic background [Ref. 4].
Interestingly, while blacks rapidly became overrepre-
sented within the Department of Defense, in relation to
their percentage of the general population, Hispanics,
Asians and other minorities have continued to be slightly
under represented. This last factor serves to highlight the
minority representation experience within the Navy, which




A. HINOBITY OFFICER STATUS AT THE STABT OF A7F ERA
With the nearly simultaneous ending of the Vietnam War
and the end of the military draft, all the armed services
found themselves compering for recruits into their officer
training programs on the open markat. The mandated require-
ment for affirmative action to increase the participation
rates of minorities also complicated the recruitment
problem. There was one mitigating factor: the services were
reducing manning, from their wartims levels. For the first
two to three years of the AVF, this reduction helped to ease
both the transition into the non-draft environment and
increasing the minority participation rates.
TABLE XIII
Minority Percsnts of Officer Corps by Branch, 30 June 1973
Service Minority Black Hispanic Other
Army 6.9 4.0 1.5 1.4
Navy 2.4 1.0 .8 .6
USA? 3.7 2.0 1.2 .6
OSHC 3.4 1.8 1.3 .8
DOD 4.5 2.4 1.2 .8
(note: percents are limited to commissioned
officers, warrant officers not included.)
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California
At the beginning of this period, the services varied
widely in the degree and distribution of their minority
officer participation. As shown, the Navy trailed all other
services in its overall minority officer participation and
differed in the distribution of those commissioned minori-
ties which it did have. Table XIII and table XIV provide
'snapshots 1 of each of the services on 30 June 1973 and ten




Minority Percents of Officer Corps by Branch, 30 June 1983
Service Minority Black Hispanic Other
Army 15.0 9.0 1.2 4.7
Navy 7.4 2.8 1.0 3.7
USAF 9.5 5.2 1.9 2.4
OSMC 6.0 3.9 1.1 1.0
DOD 13.5 5.8 1.4 3.4
(note: percents are limited to commissioned
officers, warrant officers not included.)
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California
While these snapshots dc not provide rigorous grounds
for a statistical analysis of the uinority officer recruit-
ment policies of the services, they do serve as a baseline
against which to measure minority participation in the
officer ranks and as indicators of the extent to which each
service has managed to improve its standing in this regard.
It can be seen that while the Navy has increased its
.percentage of minority officers, it has remained distinctly
below the Department of Defense average. The Navy, in
contrast to the other services, has achieved a dispropor-
tionate amount of its growth from among the ncn-black,
non-Hispanic linority groups. Warrant officers were not
included in this study because of the large differences in
the numbers of warrant officers among the services (which in
1983 ranged from over 14,000 in the Army to none in the Air
Porce) and the significant differences in method of entry,
into the warrant ranks, among the three services which do
use warrant officers.
Figures 3.1 through 3.5 show the differing rank distri-
bution of minority officers by service. In each case, the
overall rank distribution and that of each of three minority
groups. Blacks, Hispanics and all other minority officers,
are compared. The rank distribution of the entire
38
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Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California
Figure 3.2 Percent Distribution of Army, 30 June 1973.
The data upon which Figures 3.1 through 3.5 are based
















































Figure 3.3 Percent Distribution of Air Force, 30 June 1973.
officers in the Navy differed markedly from that of all
other officers in the Navy and froi that of both black and
41













































Figure 3.4 Percent Distribution of Marine Corps, 30 June 1973,
non-black officers within the Army and Air Forca. Sixty-five
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Rank
Source: Defense Man power Data Cen ter,
Montera Yr Ca lifornia
Figure 3.5 Percent Distribution of DOD, 30 June 1973.
tha Marine Corps were in the two lowest commissioned ranks
in June of 1973. This is much higher than the 29 percent
black distribution found in those two ranks across all of
the Department of Defense.
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51.9 55. 1 42.3 55. 8 33.7
11.3 9.5 14.2 14. 9 22. 1
31.9 31.0 36.9 55.8 38. 3
4.4 4.4 6.1 2.2 5.9
The distribution of all minority officers was very
similar to that of white officers in both the Army and Air
Force. Also the distribution of Hispanic officers in ths
Navy and Marine Corps was similar to that of white officers.
Other minorities, ie., non-black and non-Hispanic, had a
distribution skewed toward the two junior ranks in the
Marine Corps, but they did, in fact, follow the distribution
of all officers in the Navy in this rsgard.
TABLE IV
Percent Distribution Minority Officers, 30 June 1973
Total





DOD 100 100 103 100 100
(note; percentages are limizsd to commissioned
officers, warrant officers not included.)
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monteray, California
The distribution of the total minority officer corps
across the services relative to the proportion of commis-
sioned officers assigned to each branch at the start of the
AVF is shown in table XV.
B. NAVY OFFICER CORPS DURING A7F ERA
Starting with a particularly low percentage of minority
officers in general and both the lowest and lost junior
representation of black officers, the Navy has improved its
own record during the AVF era, but has not improved relative
to the rest of the Department of Dsfsnse. As shown in table




Navy Hinority Officer Percents, 1973-1983
Year Black Hisp Minority Total Dffs
1973 1.0 1 .0 2.2 62500
1974 1.2 1 .0 2.7 60100
1975 1.3 1 .0 '4.0 58700
1976 1.5 1 .0 4.0 57300
1977 1.8 1.0 3.7 60600
1978 2.1 1 .0 4.7 60500
1979 2.2 1 .1 5.0 59400
1980 2.4 0.7 5.7 60200
1981 2.4 0.7 6.6 61100
1982 2.8 0.9 5.6 62700
1983 2.8 1 .0 7.3 66700
(note: total officers rounds! to nearest
hundred, includes all commissioned officers
on active duty on 30 June of each year.)
Source: Defense Manpower Data Cenrer,
Monterey, California
increase of 85.8 percent in the total minority participation
rate in the Navy officer corps. Retention efforts and the
reduction of the Navy officer corps by more than 5800 from
1973 to 1976 account for a par- of this growth. However,
the larger part of this growth came from new minority
accessions.
Figure 3.6 outlines the rise in the minority percentage
of officer accessions. With the exception of a small dip in
1977, there has been a steady increase in this area. An
interesting aspect of the growth of the minority officer
accessions is that more than half of the new minority offi-
cers were not black. Even though the black segment made up
the bulk of the total minority population, blacks have aver-
aged only 39 percent of the total minority input to the Navy
officer corps thus far during the AVF era.
As shown in figure 3.7, the aon-black percentage has
been consistently near 60 percent, with the exception of
1979. This differential minority participation is most

























Figure 3.6 Navy Minority Officer Participation, 1973-1983.
The participation rates and minority distributions of
accessions in the Army and Air Force do not show such a
great divergence between blacks and non-black minorities.
Chapter five examines some aspects of this divergence within
the Navy.
Along with the improvement in total numbers of minority
officers, the Navy has also improved its distribution of
minority officers, especially that of black officers, across
the rank structure. The proportion of minority officers in
the Navy, relative to their proportion of the Defense
Department has also improved. Howaver, the Navy and Marine
Corps still remain disproportionately lower in this regard
than the Army and Air Force. The rank distribution graphs
for the Navy and the Department of Defense 30 June 1983 are
shown below in figures 3.8 and 3.9. The corresponding








1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
NonBlk% Mean = 0.61 St.Dev. = 0.136
Blk* Mean 0.39 St.Dev. = 0.136
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California
Figure 3.7 Hon-Black Minority to Minority Accession, 1973-83.
Table XVII shows the change in proportional
representation on 30 June 1983. It also shows the relative
growth of the Navy and Marine Corps officer corps within the
Department of Defense since 1973. This relative growth from
28 percent of the total Departmsnt of Defar.se officer
manning in 1973 to 30.5 percent ten years later, is another
reflection of the sea services continued low standing in
minority active duty officer distribution.
C. FUTURE MIHORiri OFFICER PARTICIPATION
The issue of minority officer accessions is a continuing
matter of concern to the Navy. The present goal is to
increase the 1983 minority officer percentage of 7.4 percent
to 11 percent by 1988. Within that goal, the following
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Figure 3.9 Percent Distribution of DOD, 30 Jane 1983.
and 2 percent other ninorities. The last minimum has already
been surpassed. Table 3.6 below details the accession




Percent Distribution of Minority Dfficers, 30 Jane 1983
Total





DOD 100 100 100 100 100
(note: percents are limited to commissioned
officers, warrant officers not included.)
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, California
45. 8 50.4 27.8 45. 4 32.2
16. 9 11.6 16.9 26.0 23.9
33-5 33.5 49.9 26.7 37.3
3. 8 4.5 5.4 1. 9 6.6
TABLE XVIII
Navy Hiaority Officer Accession Plan, 1983-1988
Race 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Black 510 544 5 79 596 613 630
Hisp 310 333 356 368 379 390
Other 122 128 135 143 147 150
Total 942 1005 1070 1107 1139 1170
(note: figures repres- 1^ acals to be achieved
and not upper limits of minority accessions.)
Source: OP-130D
This chapter has examined the past decade's experience
in minority officer participation. Prediction, to borrow
from Mark Twain, is always difficult, especially when it
involves the future. The planned accessions and the
encouraging successes, which have recently been achieved in
recruiting, give only part of the picture. The following
chapter deals with retention and the method of entry for
minorities. The past ten years have seen only moderate
success in improving the participation rates of minorities
within the Navy's officer corps. More effort is needed.
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IV. HIKORITY OF FICE R RETENTION AND METHOD OF ENTRY
The retention of minority nazal officers during the
all- volunteer era has generally baen good. The overall
minority officer retention rates since 1979 have been
comparable with those of white officers and, in several
instances, better than those of white officers. The reten-
tion rates within the individual warfare specialty communi-
ties and the various staff corps are not very reliable due
to the very small sizes of the minority cohorts within each.
This matter of small cohort size also applies to the overall
retention rates of minorities prior to 1979.
The periods of initial obligation for first term offi-
cers varies widely by source of commission, training
programs entered into during the first few years of service,
'and by branch. Additionally, 'early out' and 'reduction in
force (RIF) programs were operated differently by each of
the. services during the first several years of the AVF.
Moreover, the promotion flow rates, which have a significant
impact on career intentions have varied, and still continue
to vary, between the services and over the length of the AVF
era. For all of these reasons, we have elected net to
compare minority retention rates across the services. This
chapter only examines the retention of minority officers,
compared to the retention of white naval officers, within
the Navy.
The examination of method of entry for minority officers
includes some Department of Defensa-wide comparisons, and





The most common measure of retention rates for officers
is the Minimum Service Requirement (MSR) method. In this
method, the number of a given cohort still on active duty at
minimum service requirement minus one year (MSR-1) is taken
as a base figure and tracked out to two years beyond the
minimum obligation. The retention rate is obtained by
comparing the number remaining on active duty at the MSR+2
point to the original MSR-1 base.
The difficulty, in obtaining an ethnic-specific reten-
tion rate, lies in allowing for the differing initial obli-
gations incurred at point of entry. These initial
obligations are now typically four years, as in the case of
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate
School (OCS) . The obligations have ranged from five years,
for academy graduates, down to thre= years, for DCS officers
commissioned early in the AVF era and contract ROTC (C)
commissioned officers.
The issue can be further complicated by the accrual of
additional obligation during the first few years of active
duty. For instance, an academy graduate may apply for and
be accepted into flight training, two or three years into
his or her initial obligation. Flight training tacks on a
concurrent four-year obligation which runs from the starting
date of training.
For all of the above reasons, the use of retention rates
obtained by the MSR method is risky. Table XIX, supplied by
OP-136D, the Officer Procurement Plans section, Office of
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel
and Training, gives the retention rates for the various
ethnic categories for fiscal 1979 through 1983. Officer
retention rates for Hispanics was not available for fiscal




Officer Retention Hatas, 1979-1983
Year White Black
URL Staff URL Staff
FY 79 37 34 56 34
FY 8 42 57 45 66
FY 81 U6 67 64 53
FY 8 2 57 64 57 66
FY 83 54 64 59 53
Hispanic Other
FY 79 na na 41 90
FY 8 na na 43 82
FY 81 na na 48 63
FY 8 2 54 52 50 47
FY 83 60 41 64 47
nets: Hispanic rates included in 'Other'
rates for FY 79-FY 81
Source: OP-135D
The higher retention of minorities since 1979 may well
be due to the poor economic condition of the economy which
started to worsen at about that time. Other factors
affecting minority retention are examined in chapter five.
Another, even rougher, gauge of retention is the number
of minority officers staying on active duty beyond six
years. The best that can be said 'for this method is that it
does provide a good understanding of the ethnic composition
of the careerist portion of the officer corps. This gauge
measures the ainority population at a point when virtually
all officers are passed the period of initial obligation.
The major component which distorts this measure is the
commissioning of officers with prior enlisted service.
Table XX, makes no allowance for officers with prior
enlisted service. The assumption is made that persons with
prior enlisted service who accept an officer's commission,
with its required initial obligation of from three to five




Selected Length of Service Statistics, Naval Officers
Year Knits Black Hisp Other Total
1973
Over 6 36600 236 260 100 37180
% 6+ 60% 39% 57% 34% 60%
1978
Over 6 39300 600 370 260 40500
% 6+ 68% 48% 57% 35% 67%
1983
Over 6 41000 1084 349 1158 43700
% 6+ 67% 57% 53% 50% 66%
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Mcntere y, California
remain on active duty well beyond six years ii any case,
regardless of ethnic origin.
Table XX displays the number of officers staying or.
beyond six years ("careerists") for each of the ethnic
categories, and the percentage that this number represents
of the total number of that minority group in the officer
corps as a whole. For example, 50 percent of all white
officers on active duty in 1973 had six or more years of
service. This percentage grew to 57 percent by 1983.
As shown in table XX, there has been a rise in the
number of careerists in all ethnic categories, except
Hispanic, since 1973. The greatest increase in the
percentage of officers staying on active duty beyond six
years has been in the •other 1 category. A further breakdown
of this category reveals that most of the growth since 1979
has been in the Asian/Pacific Islander ethnic group. Blacks
have shown the next best improvement. All minorities,
however, continue to lag behind whites in this measure.
This is consistent with the opening of opportunities for





Overall Officer Retention Rates by Source, 1976-1983
(Percent)
Source 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
USNA 67 62 57 41 44 46 50 55
NROTC(R) 38 34 3 7 36 38 4 1 46 5 3
NROTC(C) 24 24 2 9 2 5 3 5 39 49 3 9
OCS 19 27 44 58 61 77 60 63
AOCS 54 54 48 29 31 47 45 59
NESEP 92 92 92 89 87 82 75 79
Source: OP-136D
The overall retention rates by source of commissioning
are shown in table XXI. (The Naval Enlisted Scientific
Education Program (NESEP) has been discontinued, but is
shown because it was a major sourcs of commissioning during
the first several years of the A7F). There is a brief
explanation of the different commissioning sources, listed
in table XXI, in the next section of this chapter.
The presently planned growth in the numbers of black and
Hispanic officers, from 1983 inventories of 2,666 (black)
and 1,110 (Hispanic) to 1988 inventories of 4,458 and 2,229,
respectively, is based upon 50 percent retention ever that
period. By 1988, the Navy plans to achieve 6 percent black
and 3 percent Hispanic representation in its officer corps
[Ref. 5].
B. HETHOD OP ENTRY
Where do the military's minority officers cone from? The
source of commissioned minority officers has important
implications for all other aspects of minority participation
in the Navy officer corps. The way in which a commission is
obtained has a considerable bearing upon ultimate rank
achieved and upon initial performance in the various
training pipelines of at. least the surface and aviation
55

communities. The source of commission often determines the
type of commission, either regular or reserve. The impor-
tance of this difference in initial type of commission
varies over time. However, the crux of the matter is that a
reserve officer must be augmented into the regular force in
order to continue a career on acti/e duty. (This does not
apply to the Training and Administration of Reserves (T&R)
community, a small group of reserve officers ostensibly kept
on active duty to administer the reserve training program).
Thus, the issue of whether the initial commission is
reserve or not, is important in times when the force is
being reduced or when sufficient regular officers are
electing to remain on active duty. Reserve officers are
then liable to be involuntarily discharged from active duty
by means of non-selection for augmentation in the regular
force. Even during periods of expansion, the augmentation
screening is a hurdle not faced by those who are initially
commissioned as regular officers.
The commissioning sources of the Navy, which closely
parallel those of the other services, are Direct Accession,
the Naval Academy, the Reserve Officer Training Corps,
Officer Candidate Schools, and enlisted commissioning
programs. These programs are briefly described below.
! Direct Accession
This is largely used for obtaining officers who are
already trained in a particular skill which is desired by
the Navy. Physicians, dentists, Lawyers and chaplains are
typical examples of direct accession officers. Other
specialists are also obtained in this manner. It is very
rare for an unrestricted line officer (URL) to be accessed
in this manner, almost all direct accessions are commis-
sioned into staff corps and as such are not eligible to
succeed to command of operational Navy units.
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2 • Naval Academy
This is a four-year undergraduate program which
confers both a Bachelor of Science degree and a regular
commission in either the Navy or tha Marine Corps. Prior to
the admission of women to all the service academies, nearly
all officers were commissioned directly into the line.
Since 1980, the percentage of academy graduates entering
staff corps has increased. The initial obligation upon
commissioning is five years on active duty. Included in
this category are the small numbers of officers commissioned
from the Military (West Point) and Air Force Academies into
the Navy.
3- Reserve Offi cer Training Corps
This program is administered on civilian campuses
throughout the nation. There are two variations of this
program, a four-and a two-year program. The four-year
program is a fully funded scholarship program involving four
summer sessions and academic courses in each of the four
undergraduate years. This program leads to a regular
commission in either the unrestricted line community of
officer specialties (such as aviation, surface, or general
line designators) or one of the staff corps. The two-year
program is a partially funded scholarship, involving two
summer sessions and academic courses during the last two
years of undergraduate work. This program leads to a
reserve commission in either the line or one or the staff
corps. Typically the majority of 3DTC commissioned officers
from both programs are commissioned into the line.
The commission from either of the programs is four-
years of active duty. (Reserve officers have been given the
opportunity to leave active duty early at various times in
the past, most recently during the three years following the
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end of the Vietnam War.) The RDTC program also includes
those officers who are commissions! into the Naval Rsserve
from the Merchant Marine Academy and the various stats-run
maritime academies. Such officers have the option of
requesting to come on active duty rather than serve in the
reserves. Furthermore, a percentage of each year's ROTC
graduates of both programs is commissioned into the Marine
Corps.
1 • Officer Cand idat e Schools
There are two large officer candidate schools run by
the Navy. Both accept college graduates for training as
naval officers and both offer rsserve commissions mainly
into the line but, as with ROTC, some officers are commis-
sioned into staff corps. Ths Aviation Officer school in
Pensacola, Florida trains personnel for aviation duty as
pilots or flight officers. The Officer Candidate School in
Newport, Rhode Island trains officers to be general line or
surface warfare officers. A number of general line officer
graduates of both schools proceed immediately tc training as
supply or intelligence staff corps officers. Unlike the
Academy and ROTC programs, all officers from the officer
candidate schools are commissioned in-co the Navy.
5 • Enlisted Com missio n ing Prog rams
These programs have been much reduced in size with
the end of the NESEP or Navy Enlisted Scientific Education
Program. This promotion now lies mainly through the Limited
Duty Officer (LDO) program which leads to a regular commis-
sion. This and the smaller number of officers promoted on a
case-by-case basis do not add sufficient people to the total
accessions to affect minority participation rates, and thus
were not considered in this study.
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The most noticeable characteristic of minority
officer accessions is the difference, as compared with whits
accessions, in distribution across the sources of commis-
sions. Table XXII shows the distribution which occurred
during the first year of the AVF. The percentage of
minority officers coming in from DCS was nearly twice that
of white officers. Within the minorities, the black propor-
tion of OCS inputs was much higher than that of other
minorities.
6. Acadeaic Pre paratory Programs
In addition tc the pre-commissioning programs, -.here
exist two important academic prep programs, which lead into
the commissioning programs. Thsse are the Broadened
Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST)
program and the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS).
Both of these programs are aimed at opening an academic path
for fleet sailors and recruits to the officer ranks.
The BOOST program places sailors and recruits who
meet the requirements in a basic mathematics and verbal
skills refresher course. Thoss candidates who are
successful in this preparatory course and meet entrance
requirements at a school with an 80TC unit, and obtain a
combined minimum SAT score of 950, are eligible for assign-
ment to a four-year ROTC scholarship. At present, in 1983,
80 percent of BOOST students are minorities. Dver the last
ten years, very few BOOST graduates have successfully
completed college and been commissioned [ Ref . 6]. The
percentage of BOOST graduates remaining into their senior
years has been increasing and this program shews some
promise of being useful in increasing the number of minority
candidates who are commissioned through ROTC.
NAPS, in contrast to the B03ST program, has been in
existence throughout the post-World War II period. Also,
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unlike BOOST, it is aimed at placing officer candidates into
a single commissioning program: the Naval Academy. The
scope of the NAPS program is considerably wider than that of
BOOST. In addition to courses in mathematics and verbal
skills, courses for chemistry, physics, and an introduction
to computers are included in the curriculum.
Being able to pattern the NAPS curriculum directly
on that of its only customer, gives NAPS an advantage over
the BOOST program. Its success rate has been relatively
good throughout the AV.F period and has been improving. Most
importantly, for purposes of increasing minority participa-
tion, NAPS has traditionally processed high school candi-
dates who are recruited into the Navy for the express
purpose of attending the Naval Academy and being commis-
sioned into the officer ranks. In addition, NAPS also
accepts fleet and Marine Corps enlisted input.
TIBLE XXII
Percent Distribution of Officer Accessions, by Source 1973










11 5 13 8 3
22 5 13 8 7
16 4 10 10 7
3 2 2 2 2
33 76 48 41 60
8 1 3 29 9
7 7 10 2 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Mcnterey, California
Table XXII shows the percent distribution of officer
accessions across sources by race for the year 1973. By
1982, the distribution had changed. Though it would be
incorrect to say that any definite overall pattern had
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emerged, there has been a steady lessening of the importance
of OCS as a minority commissioning source. The percentage
distribution data for 1973-82 is included in appendix (B) .
Minority officer accessions had drawn nearly equal, in rela-
tive terms, with that of white accessions in academy commis-
sions and - had become much less restricted to the OCS
pipeline. However, minorities remained very low in ROTC (R)
commissions. (The highest rate achieved during the period
was 15 percent in 1975 and 1977, and this source has been
steadily decreasing since then.) This is significant in
that ROTC(R) is half of the major source of regular commis-
sions, the other major source of regular commissions being
the academies.
TABLE XXIII
Percent Distribution of Officer Accessions, by Source 1982









Total 100 100 103 100 100
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center,
Mcnxerey, California
Table XXIII shows the percent distribution of
officer accessions across sources by race for the year 1982.
Tables XXIV through XXVI display the current (as of first
quarter of fiscal 1984) minority officer accession goals.
These goals represent 'targets or minimums to achieve' and
not 'quotas or maximums not to exceed'. The overall
accession goals by race are included in appendix (B) . These
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17 19 13 7 12
15 15 25 1 1 14
11 4 D 5 4
2 4 2 1 2
36 46 41 18 31
5 3 7 56 29
14 8 12 4 7

TABLE XII?
Minority Officer Accession Plan - Blacks
Fiscal Year
Source 1984 19 85 1985 1987 1988
OSNA 30 32 54 68 80
ROTS 95 100 105 110 1 15
OCS 157 160 160 160 160
A OCS 75 85 85 85 95
Enl Co mm 75 80 80 80 80
Dir Appt
Recall
85 88 85 85 35
27 34 25 25 25
Total 544 579 595 613 530
Source: OP-130D
TABLE II?
Hinority Officer Accession Plan - Hispanic
Fiscal Year
Source 1984 1985 1985 1987 1988
OSNA 33 28 39 46 50
ROTC 25 35 45 55 65
OCS 90 95 95 95 95
AOCS 65 70 70 70 70
Enl Comm 24 28 25 25 25
Dir Appt 70 70 65 65 65
Recall 26 30 30 23 20
Total 333 3 56 368 379 390
Source: OP-13DD
minority accession goals represent 15 percent to 17 percent
of total accession goals for the next five years.
Furthermore, the participation rates at the Naval
Academy are important indicators of minority progress within
the Navy. It is from this source that the overwhelming
majority of flag-rank officers, (those officers in the ranks
of Commodore and above) are obtained. The importance of
this source is further emphasized when only the unrestricted




Minority Officer Accession Plan - Other
• Fis cal Year
Source 1984 19 85 1985 1987 1988
USNA 32 32 33 34 35
ROTC 23 27 31 33 33
OCS 24 25 27 28 29
AOCS 16 18 19 19 20






7 7 7 7
Total 128 135 143 147 150
Source: OP-133D
operational units of the Navy and nake and implement policy
decisions, are taken into account.
Ail current URL four-star admirals are academy grad-
uates. Additionally, two-thirds of the current three-star
URL admirals come from this sourca. Half of all one-and
two-star URL admirals are academy graduates [ Ref . 7], This
preponderance of academy graduates in the flag-officer ranks
has prevailed thrDughout the twentieth century.
Table XXVII shows the reprs santaticr of minorities
among the entering classes of the three military academies
starting one year prior to the All-Voluntaer Force; the
class of 1976 entered the academies in 1972. There have been
significant fluctuations in Naval Academy minority admis-
sions. The black percentage of total minorities has fallen
from a high of 76 percent in the classes of 1976 and 1977 to
a steady 32 percent to 36 percent in the classes of
1983-1987. Table XXVIII shows tha drop-off in USNA black
admissions. (Similar data fcr the U.S. Military Academy
(USMA) and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) , in graph
format, are included in appendix (B) ) .
No such drop-off occurs in the admissions of either




Minority Acadeay Admissions, 1972-1983
CLASS USNA USMA DSA?A USNA USMA USAFA
Tot% Tot% Tot* BlkS Blk% Blk$
1976 7.0 8.0 6.4 5.5 3.6 3.1
1977 10. 2 10.0 6.0 7.8 5.8 3. 1
1978 11.8 11.2 8.3 5.9 6.1 3.6
1979 11. 4 10.0 11.7 4.1 6.8 4.0
1980 11.9 11.2 12.0 5.1 4.5 4.3
1981 13.3 10.8 12.5 4.2 5.7 5.0
1982 11.3 11.6 15.0 4.5 5.3 7.3
1983 13.7 11.4 15.7 5.7 5.2 7.2
1984 14.9 14.1 16.5 4.7 6.3 7.3
1985 12. 3 16.2 16.5 3.8 8.1 8.
1
1986 15.5 15.4 17.2 5.4 9.1 8.1
1987 13.5 14.8 14.9 5.0 7.8 6.0
Twelve year means and totals
USNA Totfa Mean = 12.2 USNA 3l)cs Total = 843
USMA Tot% Mean = 12.0 USMA Blks Total = 1067
USAFA rotT, Mean = 12.8 USAFA Blks Total= 1009
USNA Blk% Mean = 5.2 USNA Min Total = 1982
USMA Blk% Mean = 6.2 USMA Min Total = 2079
USAFA Blk% Mean = 5.6 USAFA Min Total
=
2312
Sources: USNA, USMA, USAFA
TABLE XX7III
Black Percent of Minority Academy Admissions
Year USNA USSA USAFA
1972 78 45 48
1973 77 53 49
1974 51 54 43
1975 36 63 34
1976 43 43 35
1977 32 52 40
1978 40 46 48
1979 42 45 46
1980 31 45 44
1981 31 50 49
1982 35 59 47
1983 37 53 40
Sources: USNA, USMA, USAFA
1981, entering in 1977, both the Military Academy and the
Air Force Academy black percentages have exceeded that of
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the Naval Academy. During the last six years. Naval Academy
black admissions have b<=>en much lowar than the other two
TABLE XXIX
Black Academy Admissions, 1977-1983
CLASS aSNA USMA USAFA
1981 56 83 75
1982 62 74 106
1983 80 72 108
1984 58 92 1 17
1985 51 124 1 19
1986 72 129 121
1987 68 112 86
Six Year Means and Totals
USNA mean 64, total 447
OSMA mean 98, total 686
USAFA mean 105, total 732
Sources: USNA, OSMA, USAFA
academies. Correspondingly, there has been a rise among
Asian/Pacific Islanders admitted into the Naval Academy.
Table XXIX shows the number of blacks admitted to the acad-
emies since 1977.
Table XXVIII indicates that the Naval Academy has
kept pace in total minority admissions with its two sister
schools. The issue of the much lDwer black proportion of
Naval Academy entrants relative to the other schools is
significant.
An important aspect of ROT3 and academy accessions
is that persons recruited into these programs are in their
teens and usually still in high school. The competition for
minorities is easier at this level. As shown in chapter two,
the number of minorities with a oollege degree is still
small and much sought after by industry.
The ROTC program is being expanded and two facets of
that expansion have significance for minority participation.
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A new unit will be opened in an as yet to be determined
predominent ly black college. More importantly, two umbrella
units will be opened in the Navy's two largest fleet
centers, San Diego, California and Norfolk, Virginia.
These units will make available an ROTC option for
students in the numerous colleges aad universities which are
located in these two geographic areas. This will give access
to ROTC scholarships to people attending schools which
otherwise would not offer such a program [ Eef . 6]. While
not aimed specifically at improving minority participation
rates in the officer corps, these changes in the ROTC
program should contribute to that end.
The Naval Academy Preparatory School is having
increasing success in providing minority officer candidates
to the Naval Academy. The overall success rates of NAPS 1
graduates (NAPSters) of all ethnic groups has been improving
and the success rate at NAPS, of minorities has kept pace.
rABLE XXX
HAPS Input and Success Rates at USHA














Table XXX shows the increases in the numbers of
minorities who sucessfully complete! NAPS and were admitted


























successful com miss ionings for NAPS inputs for each class and
for all Naval Academy admissions for each olass. The
successful commissioning rates for minorities from NAPS are
cot presently tracked by the Naval Academy. This subject
should be investigated in the near future.
TABLE ZXZI
HAPS Hinority Success Rates, 1976-1983
note: table lists input and (% admitted OSNA)
Total
Tear Black Hispanic Other Minority
success rate
1976 35 (57%) 23 (35?,) 12 (83%) 54%
1977 18 (72% 19 (63%) 16 (81%) 72%
1978 26 (65%) 13 (69%) 9 (55%) 65%
1979 52 (52% 12 (50?.) 22 (64%) 55%
1980 50 (40%) 19 (58%) 15 (47%) 45%
1981 38 (50%) 19 (47%) 18 (44%) 55%
1982 40 (80%) 23 (74%) 27 f81%) 79%
1983 52 (56%0 29 (79%) 20(100%) 71%
Source: Naval Academy Preparatory School)
Table XXXI presents the admissions history and
success rates of the ethnic groups 'at the Naval Academy
Preparatory School. The overall success rates of minorities
have been improving since 1980. This, combined with the
improving overall success rates of NAPSters at the Naval
Academy, indicates that NAPS might be an effective way to
improve minority officer participation. An additional
factor which also indicates that this might be an effective
method, is the visibility given to minority officer candi-
dates who enter through this path. This visibility extends
both to the fleet and to the general society.
Due to the very small number of successful
commissionings obtained through the BOOST program, no




I. ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT AND EXCEPTION OF MILITARY LIFE
This chapter examines organizational commitment and
perceptions of military life of minority officers in the
Navy. In addition, it assesses if and how naval officer
minorities differ frcm their peers in the other branches of
the military. To measure perceptions and organizational
commitment cf officers on active dity, data from the 1978
DOD Survey of Officers and Enlistei Personnel were examined
[Ref. 8]. This survey was administsred in January 1979 to a
worldwide sample of 92,504 men and women on active duty in
all four branches of the (J. S. military. The survey was' not
a random sample of members of the military; it was a strati-
fied sample on years cf service, grade, and sex within each
service branch.
A. DATA BASE
This survey consisted of four questionnaire variants,
two for enlisted personnel (Forms 1 and 2) and two for offi-
cers (Forms 3 and 4) . For this study, those questions from
Form 3, which dealt with economic and labor force informa-
tion, and from Form 4, dealing with quality of life in the
military were examined. The sample was narrowed to those
officers who were serving in their initial obligation and
who had been on active duty less than seven years, in order
to ensure that only personnel who had entered military
service during the AVF era would be selected for analysis.
This reduced the usable sample to 2,580 for Form 3 and 2,576
for Form U.
Junior officers responding to the survey were classified
by race, sex, method of entry (MOE) , and branch of service.
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For the purpose of this study, race was categorized as
black, Hispanic, white, and other. Table XXXII shows the
total distribution
, from both survey forms, of the sample
junior officers in each branch of service by their race and
sex.
TABLE XXXII
Sample Junior Officers Branca by Sex and Race
Sex/Race Army Navy USMC USAF DOD
Male
Black ~46 "26 ~i"i ~71 188
Hispanic
White
21 13 19 18 71
602 1 187 844 1021 3654
Other 29 45 27 32 133
Total 698 1 271 935 1 142 4046




— — — — _ _ — — _ _ _ —
Black 22 22 2 30 76
Hispanic
Whita
7 4 1 4 16
211 440 47 265 963
Other 9 25 21 55
Total 249 491 50 320 1086
Total 947 1762 985 1462 5132
The largest number of male and female junior officers
surveyed were naval officers. However, there were fewer
black and Hispanic males in the Navy than in the other
branches of the service. He chose to combine the distribu-
tions from both survey forms of tha survey in tables XXXII
and XXXIII due to the striking similarity of these
distributions.
Table XXXIII shows the total distribution of the sample
junior officers method of entry (M0E) into the military by
their race and sex. Method of entry (HOE) was divided into
five categories: (1) Academy, (2) Officer Candidate School
(OCS)
, (3) Reserve Officer Training Corps-Regular Program
(ROTC-R)
, (4) Reserve Officers Training Corps-Contract


















Saaple Janior Officers HOE by Sex and Bace
Sex/Race Academy OCS ROT3-R ROTC-C Other
39 58 34 ~33
8 12 17 28
628 425 845 1063
25 9 23 63
700 534 919 1187
18 32 2 24
6 3 7
291 137 55 480
8 3 8 36
323 175 65 547
Total 736 1023 679 934 1734
admitted to the service academies by 1979, none had been in
long enough to have graduated and received a commission at
the time the survey was conducted. Therefore, the method of
entry titled •Academy* is not applicable to female junior
officers in this sample.
As shown in table XXXIII, the msthod of entry for almost
one-third of the black males and nearly one-half of the
black females was through the RDTC-Regular Program.
Hispanic and other minority junior officers predominantly
entered the military by the other method of entry category.
The 'other 1 category consists primarily of the Health Care
Professions (Medical and Dental) ani Direct Appointment from
civilian status, such as Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps.
Only 5.8 percent of the sample minority junior officers were
academy graduates; this is important, for reasons previously
stated in chapter four regarding the prevalence of academy




The statistical technique employed in this study to
analyze the relationship of race with both organizational
commitment and perceptions was multiple classification anal-
ysis (MCA) [Ref. 9]. Sex, method of entry (MOE) , and branch
of service were used as controlling factors. M3A indicates
the level of significance of each controlling factor to the
dependent variable. The level of significance indicates the
strength of the relationships between the controlling
factors and the dependent variable being examined. The
dependent variables of interest in this chapter deal with
organizational commitment and perceptions of the sample
junior officers.
C- ORGANIZATIOIAL COMMITMENT
Measures, used as indicators of a junior officer*s orga-
nizational commitment to military sarvice, were (1) years of
intended service (YOIS)
, (2) careerist or non-careerist
intentions, and (3) staying or leaving intentions. These
measures were either direct questions on the survey, as was
the case with YOIS, or were constricted from several survey
questions.
For careerist/non-careerist determination, a dummy vari-
able was created frcm YOIS data. Sample junior officers
whose YOIS was greater than 19 years were placed in the
careerist category while those with YOIS less than 20 years
were categorized as non-careerists. A second dummy variable
was created for stayer/leaver using YOIS, the number of
current years of service (YOS) and the length in years of
remaining obligated service. Sample junior officers whose
YOIS exceeded their original service contract commitment
(current YOS plus remaining obligated service in years) were




Due to the similarities in both survey forms, we elected
to concentrate strictly :n Form 3 to further examine the
individual effects of branch of service, sex, and method of
entry (MOE) on each of the organizational commitment
measures. When examining these measures by sax, as shown in
table XXXIV, we see that, on the avarage, male sample junior
officers (1) had more years of intended military service (by
almost three full years) ; (2) wera more likely to remain in
the military past their initial obligation; and (3) were
more likely to intend on making the military a career than
their female peers.
TABLE XXXI7






*:significant at .31 level
Table XXXV shows that sample junior officers who were
members of the Air Fcrce displayed stronger organizational
commitment characteristics than their peers in the ether
branches of the military. In this table we can see a large
variation between the Air Force and the other branches of
service for all three measures. He see further that there
is very slight variation in thesa measures when the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps are compared to one another. The
sample junior officers in these branches exhibited very
little difference, on the average, in their level of




Organizational Commitment by Branch
Measures Army Navy USMC USAF
YOIS* 11. 64 11.81 11.98 13.96
Careerist* 35% 35* 37% 47%
Stayer* 57% 57% 52% 67%
Totals 475 880 488 737
*: significant at .031 level
The last factor examined for its effect on
organizational commitment was methoi of entry. Table XXXVI
shows the results of this analysis. Sample junior officers
who were commissioned through the academy route displayed,
by far, a stronger level of organizational commitment than
the officers who entered through the remaining methods.
This is understandable, when you consider that the academies
have four years to weed out those individuals, who would
otherwise exhibit weak organizational commitment, pricr to
graduation. Sample junior officers, who are graduates of
the service academies, would therefore be more apt to
display stronger feelings of organizational commitment than
their peers who entered the military through ail ether
methods of entry.
TABLE IIIVI
















Totals 3 55 499 333
*:signif icant at .001 level
73

Officers entering the military through OCS and
ROTC-Regular Program methods exhibited similar levels of
organizational commitment. The raaainirg methods of entry,
ROTC-Contract Program and other, displayed the weakest
levels of organizational commitment when compared to the
aforementioned methods of entry.
To isolate the race effect on organizational commitment,
we analyzed the data using the MCA technique while control-
ling for sex, branch of sarvice, and method of entry. As
shown in table XXXVII, race is net significantly related to
any of the three measures of organizational commitment after
controlling for sex, branch cf service and method of entry.
This indicates that race alone does not contribute signifi-
cantly to variances in organizational commitment levels
among junior officers.
TABLE XII7II
Organizational Commitment by Race
Measures Black His p. White Other F-signif.
YOIS 12.56 13.03 12.43 11.87 .892
Careerist 41% 43% 39% 38% .900
Stayer 56% 60% 59% 51% .391
Totals 128 51 2313 88
Tables XXXVI and XXXVII are extremely important tables
because they lead to the conclusion that the differences
among career intentions among races is not predominantly a
racial matter, but a method of entry matter. This finding
reinforces the presentation in chapter four regarding
methods of entry and resulting carear opportunities.
We have saen that there are very definite differences in
levels of organizational commitment by sex, branch of
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service, and method of entry, and that difference in
organizational commitment based on raca can not be concluded
when controlling for sex, branch of service and method cf
entry for junior officers. Further analysis was conducted to
determine if there were differences in levels of organiza-
tional commitment by race and branch of service while
controlling for sex and method of entry.
A significant difference in level of organizational
commitment by race and branch of service for junior officers
did exist for the Air Force when controlling for sex and
method of entry. Table XXXVIII shows that, race was signifi-
cantly related to organizational commitment for the Air
Force, at the .05 level for YOIS and Stayer aad at the .01
level for Careerist when controlling for sex and method of
entry. Race was also significantly related to the measure of
organizational commitment titled •Stayer' for the Army, at
the 0.1 level of significance when controlling for sex and
method of entry.
TABLE XXI7III
Organizational CoMitment by Race and Branch
F-Significanoe
Measures Army Navy US3C USAF DOD
YOIS .534 .386 .846 .041 .892
Careerist .820 .458 .935 .098 .900
Stayer .053 .374 .879 .026 .391
Totals 475 880 438 737 2580
As stated in chapter four, black admissions to the Naval
Academy have not kept up with those of the other two service
academies over the past six years. It has already been
determined that OCS and ROTC graduates exhibit similar
levels of organizational commitment. Also previously
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established was that academy graduates displayed much
stronger levels of organizational commitment than their
peers who entered the military through other sources. Thus a
branch of service which relied mors on its service academy
as a source of commissioning for ins officers than the other
methods of entry would more likely be comprised of officers
with stronger levels of organizational commitment to the
military.
The majority of Air Force and Army minority officer
accessions enter the military through the academy and ROTC
Regular programs; whereas the majority of Navy minority
accessions receive their commissions through DCS. Tables
XXXVI through XXXVIII indicate that the Navy must improve
its position relative to the other two service academies
with respect to minority officer accessions in the future if
there is to be an improvement in the level of organizational
commitment for naval minority officers.
Variables from both survey forms which dealt with
attitude/opinion rather than behavioral differences among
junior officers were selected for analysis to determine if
minority differences by branch of service existed in the
area of perceptions.
D. PEBCEPTIOBS OP HILITiSY LIPE
The manner in which sample junior officers perceived
their environment and life in the military was examined next
to determine if and how differences existed between naval
minority officers and their peers in the other branches of
service in the military. Seven questions from the survey
data were selected to examine sample junior officer percep-
tions of military life. Table XXXIX lists seven of ques-





Questions Affecting Officer Perceptions
Form 3
1. Probability of Promotion to the next paygrade.
2. Military Life as expected (5 pt Likert scale)
3. Satisfaction with Mil Life (7 pt Likert scale)
Form U
4. Current Location: -Problem: - Racial Tensions.
5. Opinion: Racial Treatment (5 pt Likert scale).
6. Racial Group with the best Promotion chances.
7. Discrimination: — the Daily Duty Assignments.
Multiple classification analysis was used to test simul-
taneously for effects of sex, race, branch of service, and
method of entry for each of the questions listed in table
XXXIX The sampls junior officers were asked what they
thought their chances were cf being promoted to the next
higher paygraie, and were instructed to respond on a scale
(from 0.0— no chance, to 1 .©--certain) when sslecting their
answer to this question.
As shown in table XL, with the exception of sex, all of
the remaining controlling factors wsre significantly related
to the perception of promotion chances, at the .01 level of
significance. white sample junior officers felt that their
chances were significantly better for promotion than did the
minorities. This was also true for chose sample junior offi-
cers who had entered the military tarough one of the service
academies. In addition, members of the Navy and Marine Corps
perceived that their chances for promotion were
significantly better than did their peers in the Army and
Air Force.
The sample junior officers were asked if they thought
that military life was what they had expected it to be when
they first entered the service. They were asked to select





(Controlling for sax, race, branch and HOE)
Average N F-Signif.
Sex — - (.413)
Male 9.23 1703
Female 9. 30 456
Race — - (.004)
Black 8.93 110








ROTC (R) 9.47 292
ROTC (C) 9.41 403
Other 8.83 667
Branch — - (.001)
Army 9.11 373
Navy 9. 35 748
9.49 422USMC
USAF 9.01 621
*10-pt scale from 0.0 (no chance) to 10.0 (certain)
agree that it was what I thought it would be, to
5.0--strongly disagree) . As shown in table XLI, none of the
controlling factors appeared to have significance with
regard to this guestion.
The sample junior officers were asked, considering all
things, how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the
military as a way of life. They were asked to select an
answer from a 7-point Likert scale (which ranged (from
1.0--very dissatisfied with the military as a way of life,
to 7.0--very satisfied). As shown in table XLII, all factors
except for race were significantly related to this guestion,
at the .01 level of significance. The absence of race as a
significantly related factor is in itself significant
because it indicates that it did not play a role in the
level of satisfaction of the sample junior officers with
life in the military. All races ware fairly homogeneous in




Hilitary Life as Expected*
(Controlling for sex, race, branch and HOE)
Average N P-Signif-
Sex — - (.869)
Male 2.50 2022
Female 2. 51 541
Race — - (.912)
Black 2. 56 127
Hispanic 2. 47 51
2.50 2299White
Other 2.49 36
MOE — - (.126)
Academy 2. 51 366
DCS 2.44 5U
ROTC (R) 2. 42 341
ROTC (C 2.59 495
Other 2. 52 84 5





*5-pt scale from 1.0 (strongly agree)
to 5.0 (strongly disagree)
The sampls junior officers were then asked to respond,
by selecting an answer from a 4-point scale (ranging from
1.0--serious problem, to 4. 0--no problem), as to how much of
a problem they felt that racial tension was at their current
location. As shown in table XLIII, all factors were
significantly related to this question, at the .001 level of
significance.
Black sample junior officers were well below the overall
average response on this question which indicates that they
did, in fact, perceive that racial tension was a problem at
their current locations. However, based upon their
responses, there was only slight variance in the perceptions
of Hispanics, other minorities and whites which indicates
that they did not perceive that there was a problem with




Satisfaction with Military Life*
(Controlling for sex, race, branch and MOE)
—
.
— Aver age N F-Signif.
(.001)Sex »— -
Male a. 09 2027 —




Black 4. 28 123 —
Hispanic 4. 42 51 —
White 4. 18 2303 - _
Other 4. 09 83 - -
M3E _ — _ (.010)
Academy 4. 19 366
DCS 4. 22 513 —
ROTC (R) 4. 47 339 —
ROTC (C) 4. 10 497 —




fcrmy 3. 97 473 —
Navy
asMC
4. 14 874 —
4. 65 486 —
asAF 4. 09 734 --
*7-ot scale from 1.0 (very dissatisfied)
to 7.0 (very satisfied)
Sach of the sample junior officers were asked how close
the statements on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1.0— blacks
treated a let better than whites, to 5.0--blacks treated a
lot worse than whites) came to their opinion regarding
racial treatment in their branch of the service. As shown in
table XLIV, method of entry and sax were not significantly
related to this question, however, race and branch of
service were, at the 0,1 level of significance. The sample
junior officers who were black were well above the overall
average response for this question which indicates that they
perceived that they received worse treatment than their
white peers in their branch of service.
When asked which racial group they felt had the best
chances for promotion in their branch of service, sample




Current Location: Problem: Racial Tension*





Male 3. 34 1763
Female 3. 12 477
Race __ _





Other 3. 28 83
MOE __ _
Aca demy 3. 25 322
ocs 3. 35 444
ROTC (R) 3.30 297
Rorc (c) 3. 40 425













*4-pt scale from 1.0 (serious probleml
to 4.0 (no problem)
4-point scale (ranging from 1.0--whites have the best
chance, to 4.0--chances are equal for ail races) . The only
factor which was significantly related to this question was
race, at the .001 level of significance, as shown in table
XLV. Black sample junior officers were well below tha
overall average response for all races indicating that they
perceived that their white peers aad a much better chance
for promotion within their branch Df service than blacks in
general.
The remaining question selected for this study for the
purpose of examining perceptions hai ro do with whether the
sample junior officers had ever personally experienced
racial or ethnic discrimination at their present duty
station with regard to assignment of daily duties. As shown












Sax — — —
Male 2. 86 1968
Female 2. 90 545
Race __ _









Aca demy 2. 87 354
OCS 2. 87 494
ROTC (R) 2. 86 327
ROTC (C) 2. 89 475
Other 2. 86 85 '4
Branch —_ —









*5-pt scale from 1.0 (blacks treated lot better)
to 5.0 (blacks trsated much worse)
the 0.1 level of significance, to this question. Once
again, we see that the response of blacks indicates that
they had a stronger percsption than any other racial group
that they wer= discriminated against, based on color, in
daily duty assignments.
Race has been a significant factor in the majority of
questions examined regarding perception of the sample junior
officers. The perception of discrimination based upon race
was held by blacks, despite the fact that all the branches
of service in the military purportsdly had strong affirma-
tive action plans which had been instituted in the early
1970s to ensure that all personnel received fair and equal
treatment.
To determine if there were any significant differences




Racial Group: Best Promotion Chance*




21 1)Sex -- -
Male 3. 06 1973
Female 3. 15 541
Race _ _ _
Black 1. 74 130
HisDanic 2. 95 35
White 3. 16 2253
Other 3. 04 95
MOE __ _
Academy 2. 99 365
DCS 3. 10 492
ROTC (R) 3. 07 329
ROTC (C) 3— * 04 471













*4-pt scale from 1.0 (whites had best chance)
to 4.0 (chances egual all races)
for sex and method of entry, each question from table XXXIX
was re-examined specifically for each race, using multiple
classification analysis. The results of this analysis are
shown for blacks, Hispanics and others (ncn-black,
non-Hispanic minority) in tables XL7II through XLIX,
respectively.
With one exception, racial group attitudes did not vary
significantly by branch of service. The one exception is
found in table XLIX, where it can be seen that the opinion
that racial tension was a problem was significantly related
to Army, at the .05 level of significance.
E. COHCLOSIO*
The data suggests that members of the Air Force differ




Discrimination: Daily Duty Assignments*
(Controlling for sax, race, branch and MOE)
Signif
(.029)
Average N F- .
Sex -- -
Male . 05 1981
Female . 08 552








Aca demy .04 365
ocs . 07 498
ROTC (R) . 10 332
ROTC (C . 06 478
Other . 05 859
Branch —









binary 0.0 (no) — 1.0 (yes)
2.60 2.47 2.69 2.52 .91 1
4 .40 4.03 4. 33 4.41 .912
2.54 3.15 2.98 2. 14 . 161
3 .65 3.97 3.69 3.75 .242
1 .74 1.54 1.85 1.79 .869
.34 .23 .27 .33 .696
TABLE XL¥II
Perceptions of Minority Officers by Branch, Blacks
Survey Questions Army Navy USMC USAF F-Signif.
1. Prob of Promotion 8.92 9.55 8.99 8.64 .463
2. Mil Life as ExDtd
3. Sat with Mil Life
4. Current Loc. Prob
5. Racial Treatment.
6. Best Promo Chance
7. Daily Duty Assign
from their peers in the other branches of service in the
military. It also appears that race is significantly
related to the level of organizational commitment of Air
Force junior officers. It has been determined that differ-
ences in level of organizational commitment among junior





Perceptions of Minority Officers by Branch, Hispanics
Survey Questions Army Navy OSHC USAF F-Signif.
1. Prob of Promotion
2. Mil Life as Exptd
3. Sat with Mil Life
4. Current Loc. Prob
5. Racial Treatment.
6. Best promo Chance
7. Daily Duty Assign
8 .31 9.97 9.41 8.14 . 36 1
2.78 1.91 2.52 2.33 .212
3.80 5.15 4.99 4.27 .309
2.75 3.14 3. 10 3.99 .254
2.89 2.7'4 2.62 3.21 .263
3 .17 3.21 2. 29 3.19 .577
.01 .03 .08 .02 .793
TABLE XLII
Perceptions of Minority Officers by Branch, Others
Survey Questions Amy Navy USMC USAF F-Sianif.
1. Prob of Promotion 8.04 8.61 9.49 8.48 .506
2. Mil Life as Exptd 2.38 2.33 2.23 2.91- .164
3. Sat with Mil Life 3.46 4.30 4.43 3.81 .235
4. Current Loc. Prob 2.68 3.38 3.49 3.36 .050
5. Racial Treatment. 2.82 2.74 2.76 2.78 .982
6. Best promo Chance 3.17 3.19 2.63 2.92 .611
7. Daily Dutv Assign .16 .04 .10 .09 .582
With regard to perceptions of life in the military,
differences do exist among minorities in their perceptions,
as far as the questions which were selected for examination
were concerned. These differences in perceptions did not
vary significantly by branch of service. It was, however,
demonstrated that black sample junior officers displayed the
least positive perceptions of any racial/ethnic group in the
survey.
The data which were selected for study did not support
the viewpoint that naval minority officers differ in their
views of the military when compared to their peers in the
other branches of the Armed Services. This is net to say
that it has been conclusively proven that no branch differ-
ences among black officers attitudss exist. Further anal-
ysis of these survey data, possibly examining variables
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concerning economic and labor fores information rather than
quality of life information, as we lid, might reveal that
differences by branch do exist. Therefore, it is recommended
tha* further analysis be conducted regarding this topic.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND R ECD M HEN DATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that the minority segment of the population
has yet to participate, to a representative degree, in the
officer ranks of the Navy. The measures already taken to
increase this participation have resulted, thus far, in a
minority officer corps which is proportionately smaller than
those of the Army and the Air Force, and very unrepresenta-
tive of the minority distribution in the general population.
We feel that the following conclusions are warranted.
1. There was no significant participation of minorities
in the officer ranks of any of the United States Armed
Forces prior to World War II. Commencing with World War II,
minority officer participation grew extremely slowly. The
impetus for this participation came primarily from outside
the Department of Defense, through Presidential action.
2. The minority portion of the 18-to-24 year old
segment of the population is growing, at the same time that
the size of that segment is declining. It is from this
18-to-24 year old segment of the population that nearly all
officer and enlisted accessions are obtained.
3. The reguirements of the Navy for increased numbers
of officer accessions will, given the declining size and
changing proportions of the 18 to 24 year old pool, reguire
increasing the percentage of minority officer accessions.
4. The participation of minority officers within the
Navy differs in the following ways from that of the Army and
Air Force:
a. Prior to 1973, the Navy minority officer corps
increased more slowly than those of the Army and Air
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Force. This occurred in spite of the Navy's longer
history of enlisted integration.
b. The Army and Air Force have achieved, and main-
tained, a higher percentage of minority officers
throughout the all volunteer sra.
c. Black officers in the Navy are undsrrepresented
both in terms of the black percentage of the general
population and in terms of ths black percentage of the
minority population.
d. Non-black, non-Hispanic minorities, in partic-
ular Asian/Pacific Islanders, are over represented in
the Navy officer ranks relative to their percentage of
the general population and minority population and
relative to their representation in the other
services.
e. The prestige commissioning sources of the Army,
Air Foroe and Navy, the three military academies, have
had minority participation histories similar to those
of their respective services during the all volunteer
era. The black admission percentages and numbers at
the Naval Academy have been lower than those of West
Point and Colorado Springs throughout this period.
Similarly, the participation rates of non-black minor-
ities at Annapclis have been higher than those of the
other schools.
5. Black officers sampled in the Department of Defense
survey had the least positive perceptions of the service of
any of the ethnic groups surveyed.
6. Race or ethnicity was not a significant determinant
in predicting differences in level of organizational commit-
ment. However, method of entry dii play a significant role
in the differences in levels of organizational commitment.
Academy graduates, irrespective of race, exhibited the
highest level of organizational commitment. It is from this
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scarce of entry that the majority of flag-rank officers are
obtained.
7. The Naval Academy Preparatory School is an effective
method of entry into the Naval Academy commissioning program
for minorities. The overall success rate of NAPS graduates
at the Naval Academy has been improving and is presently
better than that of the overall success rate of all Academy
entrants. The Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection
and Training (BOOST) program has not achieved comparable
success thus far
.
8. The minority participation rates within the Navy
officer corps are increasing steadily. The increasing
minority accession rates and highar-than-average minority
retention rates should raise minority representation to
levels commensurate with minority population percentages by
the 1990*s. The black officer segment will probably be the
last minority to achieve such representation.
B. RECOHHEHDATIOHS
1. It is recommended that the present efforts being made
to increase the participation ratss of minority officers,
such as BOOST and the opening of new ROTC units in predomi-
nently black colleges, be continue!. Given the increasing
size of the minority segment of the primary supply of mili-
tary accessions and the Navy»s growing need for additional
manpower, establishing an image, and the reality, of signif-
icant minority participation in the officer ranks is a
necessity if the recruiting of minorities is to be
sustained.
2. It is recommended that the Naval Academy Preparatory
program be studied for possible improvement of the BOOST
program. Specifically, the narrowing of focus of the BOOST
program to supply officer candidates to only a few ROTC
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units, rather than to all units, is recommended for
consideration. This might allow a mora 'in depth'
preparation ta be given each BOOST student.
3. It is recommended that coasideration be given to
increasing the number of minority officer candidates
admitted to the Naval Academy Preparatory School, and also
to increasing the number admitted directly to the Naval
Academy itself. A study of the success rates of NAPS
produced minorities within the acads-my should be included as




aiNOBITT OFFICER DISTRIBUTION DATA
U. S. NAVY 30 Juns 1973
RANK OTHER WHITE HISP BLACK TOTAL
ENS 104 9962 107 291 10464.0
LTJG 70 10870 84 158 11 182.0
LT 93 16358 121 99 16671 .0
LCDR 73 15214 124 88 15499.0
CDR 31 8096 57 44 8228.0
CAPT 8 394 1 23 10 3982.0
FLAG 308 2 1 311 .0
RANK WHIDIST BLKDIST HISPDIST TOTDI5 r OTHDIST
ENS 0. 15 0.42 0.21 0. 16 0.27
LTJG 0. 17 0.23 0.16 0. 17 0. 18
LT 0. 25 0. 14 0.23 0.25 0.25
LCDR 0. 23 0.13 Q.2H 0. 23 0. 19
CDR 0. 13 0.06 0. 1 1 0. 12 0. 08
CAPT 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02
CTHTOT H HI TOT HISPTOT BLKTOT TOTAL
379. 64749.0 518. 691. 66 3 37
TOTAL MINORITIES 1588 TOTAL OFFICERS 66337
PERCENT MINORITY 2..4% PERCENT BLACK 2.4%*
PERCENT HISPANIC 0. 8% PERCENT OTHER 0.6%
U. S. ARMY 30 Juna 1973
RANK OTHER WHITE HISP BLACK TOTAL
1 LT 772 11382 236 333 12723
2LT 183 14010 240 484 14917
CAPT 282 34045 575 1435 36337
MAJ 92 17595 287 975 18949
LCOL 69 11395 165 656 12285
COL 20 5307 58 100 5485
FLAG 488 1 9 498
RANK WHI3IST BLKDIST HISEDIS;t TOTDIST OTHDIST
1LT • 12 .08 .15 . 13 .54
2LT • 15 .12 .15 . 15 .13
CAPT • 36 .36 .37 .36 .20
MAJ 19 .24 .13 . 19 .06
LCOL 12 .16 .11 . 12 .05
COL • 06 .03 .04 .05 .01
OTHTOT WHITOT HISPTOT BLKTOT TOT
1418.00 9422 2.0 1562.00 3992.00 101194
TOTAL MINORITIES 6972 TOTAL OFFICERS 10 1194
PERCENT MINORITY 7. 0% PERCENT 3LACK 4.0%



































































































PERCENT HISPANIC 1. 2%
TOTAL OFFICERS 1 14962
PERCENT BLACK 2.0%
PERCENT OTHER 0.6%




































































































5 98 TOTAL OFFICERS 17784
3.4% PERCENT BLACK 1.8%
















































































TOTAL MINORITIES 13442 TOTAL OFFICERS
PERCENT MINORITY 4.5ft PERCENT BLACK
























































































TOTAL MINORITIES 296 74 TOTAL OFFICERS 23 1454
PERCENT MINORITY 10.5% PERCENT BLACK 5.7%




0. S. Nav y •30 Juna 1983
RANK CTHER WHITE HIS? BLACK TOTAL
ENS 266 9U99 173 364 10302
LTJG 26 1 9587 123 400 10371
LT 1099 18862 172 758 20891
LCDR 538 1250 3 118 286 13445
CDR 232 7795 48 56 8131
CAPT 52 3868 26 30 3986
FLAG 1 247 1 3 252
ANK WHIDIST BLKDISr HISPDIST TOTDIST 3THDIST
ENS .15 .19 .25 . . 15 . 1 1
LTJG .15 .21 . 19 . 15 . 1 1
LT . 30 .40 .26 .31 .45
LCDR .20 .15 . 18 .20 .22
CDR .12 .03 .07 . 12 .09
CAPT .06 .02 .04 .06 .03
OTHTOT WHITOT HISPTOT BLKTOT TOTAL
2459 62361 661 1897 67378
TOTAL MINORITIES 50 17 TOT\L OFFICERS 57373
PERCENT MINORITY 7. 4% PERCENT BLACK 2.8%
PERCENT HISPANIC 1. 0% PERCE NT OTHER 3. 6%

















































































































































































































































































































Percentage Distribution of Dfficers by Rank


































Percentage Distribution of Officers by Rank



























Percentage Distribution of Officers by Rank
0. S. Marine Corps 30 June 1933
































HIHORITT OFFICER ACCESSION DISTRIBOTIOH DATA
1973








OTHER 0. 11 0.05
ACADEMY 0. 22 0.05
ROTC(R) 0. 16 0.04
ROTC(C) 0. 03 0.02
OCS 0. 33 0.76
DIR APPT 0. 08 0.01










SOURCE WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHER TOT MIN
OTHER 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 0. 10
ACADEMY 0.24 0.07 0.21 0.03 0.08
ROTC(R) 0. 18 0.11 0.17 0.08 0. 11
ROTC(C) 0.03 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.01
OCS 0.30 0.59 0.32 0.22 0. 37
DIR APPT 0.01 0.0 0.02 0.56 0.25










DIR APPT 0. 01

























DIR APPT 0. 02


















SOURCE WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHER TOT MIN
OTHER 0.25 0.20 0.32 0.21 0.22
ACADEMY 0. 16 0.18 0.03 0.13 0. 15
ROTC(R) 0. 18 0.18 0.22 0.07 0. 15
ROTC(C) 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.07
OCS 0.26 0.22 0.19 0. 15 0. 19
DIR APPT 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.38 0. 17





OTHER 0. 22 0.20
ACADEMY 0. 16 0.16
ROTC (R) 0. 16 0.20
ROTC(C) 0.03 0.08
OCS 0.27 0.23
DIR APFT 0. 07 0.09











































SOURCE WHITE BLACK HISPANIC OTHER TOT MIN
OTHER 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.24
ACADEMY 0. 13 0.21 0.33 0.19 0.22
ROTC(R) 0. 14 0.06 0.0 0.03 0.04
ROTC(C) 0.02 0.07 0.0 0.01 0.03
OCS 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.34
DIR APPT 0. 06 0.06 0.11 0. 16 0. 10

















DIR APPT 0. 08










SOURCE WHITE • BLACK HISPANIC OTHER TDT MIN
OTHER 0. 17 0.19 0.13 0.07 0. 12
ACADEMY 0. 15 0.15 0.25 0.11 0. 14
ROTC(R) 0. 11 0.04 0.0 0.05 0.04
ROTC(C) 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02
OCS 0.36 0.46 0.41 0.18 0.31
DIR APPT 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.56 0.29




Black Percentage of Minority Admissions











Black Percentage of Minority Admissions
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